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Abstract
This paper proposes a new way to model the cost of climate change, based on
a vintage capital modeling. Climate change destroys capital, according to the dif-
ference between the current climate and the climate that prevailed when a given
durable was built. This assumption is meant to account for the adaptation of eco-
nomic agents to the changing climate. The main result is that the carbon tax is
much less sensitive to the rate of time preference than in the Stern-Nordhaus con-
troversy. Moreover, despite an estimate of the cost in line with Nordhaus’ estimate
for the 21st century, we find an optimal carbon tax much lower than his one.
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Introduction
This paper aims at lowering the importance attached to the discount rate in
the debate about climate change. We argue that the importance of discounting
is overestimated, because the cost of global warming on the very long run
is overestimated. In a numerical vintage capital model based on a modified
version of Nordhaus’ DICE model 2 , we show that important changes in the
discount rate have a small impact on the estimate of the carbon tax.
The Stern review 3 on climate change was given an important media coverage
due to both its very pessimistic conclusions and the good scientific reputa-
tion of its author. According to him, the correction of the external effect of
1 The author is grateful to Peef Lesh’n for his helpful comments.
2 Nordhaus (2007)
3 Stern (2007)
greenhouse gazes requires an increasing Pigovian tax starting from a current
level of $350 per ton of carbon. However, since the publication of the Review,
many authors have noticed that the result is very sensitive to the choice of
a very low rate of time preference (ρ), coupled with a unitary elasticity of
marginal utility of consumption (α) 4 . This debate has become a controversy
since William Nordhaus published another study of the economics of climate
change 5 with very different numerical results. He advocates a current carbon
tax of $32 per ton, ten times smaller than Stern’s. Although Nordhaus’ work
rely on assessment studies that are less pessimistic than the ones used by
Stern, the main reason for such different results is that Nordhaus uses a rate
of time preference of 1.5 percent and an elasticity of 2. Nordhaus has a pos-
itive approach: he calibrates those parameters out of empirical consumption
growth rates and interest rates using Ramsey equation. Stern has a normative
approach, at least for the rate of time preference: he states that the only reason
why a generation’s welfare should be discounted is the risk of disappearance of
the mankind. It follows that the estimate of the cost of climate change has be-
come dominated by an ethical question: how much should present generations
value the welfare of future ones?
However, there is a consensual point in this controversy: Stern and Nordhaus
roughly agree on the economic model that should support the climate change
debate. Their common model is inspired by stock-pollution-optimal-control
models a` la Plourde (1972) or Forster (1973). According to these models, a
representative agent derives some utility from the use of a polluting good. The
pollution accumulates into a stock that generates a cost or a disutility. There
are few differences between the Stern-Nordhaus model and those textbook
models. The main difference is that Stern and Nordhaus deal with a grow-
ing economy. In Nordhaus’ DICE, the growing economy is represented by a
Ramsey-like optimal saving model, like in Ploeg and Withagen (1991) 6 . The
other difference is that the cost due to global warming is expressed in money
equivalent. More precisely, both Stern and Nordhaus convert the state of the
average temperature into an economic loss in terms of GDP percentage 7 .
Since temperature is expected to be higher than the current level for several
centuries whatever the scenario, and since GDP is expected to grow in the
4 see Weitzman (2007), Heal (2009) or Gollier (2006) among others.
5 Nordhaus (2007)
6 A big difference, from an analytical point of view, between Nordhaus’ Dice and
Ploeg and Withagen (1991) is that in the later, the resource scarcity is not accounted
for, whereas fossil fuels are modeled as a non renewable resource in DICE. The clos-
est theoretical models to Nordhaus’ are Krautkraemer (1985) and Stollery (1998),
but both models take pollution as irreversible. The presence of a capital stock, a
resource stock and a pollution stock in the context of global warming generates
intricate dynamics that impedes a deep analytic investigation.
7 The stock of pollution does not directly decrease the utility.
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same time 8 , both authors predict a very high cost of global warming for the
future generations. This cost is expected to be monotonically increasing over
time. Under those assumptions, it is not surprising that the present-friendly
parameters ρ and α have a strong impact on the evaluation of the cost of
climate change.
This paper argues that there may not be a monotonic relationship between
the age of a generation and the cost it suffers due to global warming. This
result comes from a switch in the modeling of the cost of global warming: while
current literature usually models it with a stock of pollution (temperature is
modeled as a public bad), we argue that it is not the temperature by itself that
is harmful but changes in temperature. Those changes are assumed to destroy
a part of the human-made capital. This unusual modeling is meant to account
for the adaptation of economic activities to the changing climate in the long
run. The underlying assumption is that investment is climate-dependent. A
changing climate will destroy a part of the durable goods that are not fit to the
new temperature. But the new investments are performed according to this
new temperature. It follows that the damage due to climate change, expressed
in percent of GDP, reaches a peak when temperature change is the fastest,
and then falls down when temperature stabilizes.
The main consequence of this modeling is that a change in the discount rate
have a smaller effect on the value of the current carbon tax than in the Stern-
Nordhaus controversy. Our approach and the Stern-Nordhaus approach are
not mutually exclusive, but can be considered as complements. Our aim is to
establish a clear distinction between both, by presenting them as polar cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 1 justifies in an informal
way our approach of the cost of climate change, section 2 plugs our model
into a modified version of Nordhaus’ DICE model, section 3 presents the main
results, and section 4 is a discussion section.
1 Our approach of the cost of climate change
In this section, we compare the Stern-Nordhaus modelling of the cost of climate
change to ours. Stern and Nordhaus have different values for the carbon tax,
but they share roughly the same model of the economics of global warming.
This conceptual agreement was shown in Nordhaus (2007), who finds Stern’s
$350 current carbon tax just by using Stern’s ethical parameters in his DICE
model, namely the almost-zero pure rate of time preference and the unitary
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. Their model is a classical
8 Due to capital accumulation, population growth and technical progress.
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stock-pollution model. The economic impact of temperature can be presented
by the following equation:
COSTt = ω (Tt)×GDPt
where Tt is the temperature at time t
9 and ω an increasing function R →
[0; 1]. Nordhaus’ calibration is COSTt = 0.0028388T
2
t ×GDPt. Assume that,
from 2200 to infinity, the temperature stabilizes at 4 celcius degrees above
the pre-industrial level. Then, the cost of global warming would be 4.54% of
GDP forever, which is important. Stern’s prediction are even more pessimistic:
cost would be 13.8% of GDP from 2200 to infinity. With such a modeling,
the impact of discounting is obvious. A high discount rate lowers this huge
future cost, a very small one does not. This modeling of the climate damage is
meant to aggregate a large amount of sectoral-regional studies. However, this
aggregation is not neutral. Indeed, most assessment studies have an outcome
that can be formulated as follows:
A x degree C increase in the average temperature (with respect to the pre-
industrial level) would have a cost of $ y in the sector of (...) for the country
(...)
To be clear, most such studies actually account for adaptation in dynamical
context. See, for instance, Tol (2002), for a discussion of the adaptation process
and for related references. The point we make is that such studies have to be
translated into the above-written sentence in order to be used by Stern and
Nordhaus models.
Starting from this point, the y values are divided by the GDP of the country.
For a given x, the aggregate cost is simply the sum of all sectoral and regional
costs. Since studies are performed for different values of x, the modeler is
endowed with a vector of temperatures and a vector of aggregate costs. Thus,
he only has to specify a functional form for ω and use any relevant econometric
tool to estimate the coefficients. However, even if the assessment studies are
relevant (i.e. give good estimates of the damage), it does not follow that the
ω function is relevant: such a deduction relies on the implicit assumption
that the relation between the temperature and the cost is constant over time.
Adaptation to the new climate makes a constant relation unlikely. Adaptation
is a matter of time: if an abrupt climate change occurred at time t, then
virtually no adaptation would be possible at t+ 1, a greater adaptation would
be implemented at t + 10. If the change is permanent, the adaptation would
certainly be total at t+700. Our model aims at accounting for this adaptation
process.
9 To be more precise, they take Tt as the temperature increase with respect to the
pre-industrial level. But since the reference level is constant, the result is the same
as if Tt was the temperature level.
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Unlike Stern and Nordhaus, we argue that it is not the temperature by itself
that is harmful but the changes in the temperature. Since Stern and Nordhaus
implicitly assume that the cost of climate change is only due to the switch from
a favorable climate to a less favorable one, we adopt the opposite extreme view
that there is no favorable or unfavorable climate, but that the change is costly
in itself (section 4 presents both approaches as polar cases). This change is
assumed to destroy a part of the human made capital. The underlying ideas
behind those assumptions are:
(1) Economic development involves capital accumulation
(2) Capital accumulation is partly climate-dependent
The first point is quite obvious, but it should be underscored that the con-
cept of capital must be understood in a very general sense. A factory is a
capital good, but so is a household’s house, a railway, a healthy environment
etc. All those goods are capital goods because they are assets that allow for
future utility or benefit. Most often, they need to be built. Some goods such
as a healthy environment are sometimes given by the nature, or sometimes
humanly built when the eradication of a disease is needed.
The second point is fundamental. In virtually every country in the world,
whatever the per capita income, both heavily populated areas and almost
desert regions can be found. Both former forests that were converted into
farmable lands and other ones that remain wild forests can be found. The
choice of where to live or where to make agriculture is certainly not fully
random. Cities are often built close to a river or to the sea, in flat places,
away from hurricanes. Agriculture usually takes place where the soil is fertile,
where the weather is shiny enough or rainy enough according to the crops. The
optimal location of economic activities has to do with the climate. It follows
that a climate change alters the optimal location of economic activities. On
the short run, this sub-optimality results in a direct cost. On the long run, it
results in the need for migration of economic activity toward the new optimal
location. Since a large part of the capital is unmovable, or very costly to move,
the migration will ultimately result in the destruction of a part of the capital.
In the formal model described in section 2, we focus on this long run cost of
climate change, namely, capital destruction.
In the new optimal location, the new temperature has no cost. But starting
from this new temperature, if climate keeps on changing, the same sort of
migration will take place. To sum up, if temperature increases by 1 degree
at time 1, and by another degree at time 2, the following happens: at time
1, a part of the capital will be destroyed, and the function that gives the
quantity of destroyed capital will have ”1” as variable. Then, the new capital
goods built at time 1 are labeled with the new temperature. Then, at time 2,
economy is endowed with two types of capital: durables built before time 1,
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and durables built at time 1. For the first category, the destruction suffered at
time 2 is function of 2 (the rise in temperature since the durables were built).
For the second category, the destruction is function of 1 (because temperature
has only increased by 1 degree since they were built). Under those conditions,
if temperature stabilizes for a long time, the cost tends toward zero, and all
economic activities take place at an optimal location. Since climate change is
due, for a large part, to the use of non-renewable resources, it is likely that,
on the long run, temperature stabilizes 10 .
Now, let us illustrate the difference between Stern-Nordhaus approach and
ours. The cost of global warming is expected to arise from phenomenons such
as the rise in the sea level, the migration of the so-called climate refugees or the
change in the agricultural yields due to drought. We argue that most of this
cost is due to the gap between the climate that prevailed when investments
were made and the current climate. Let us take three simple examples to
illustrate this point.
It is well known that the huge coastal part of Bangladesh is very likely to
be submerged if the ocean level rises. This would result in a very important
and presumably very costly migration. A household who owns a $50’000 house
would bear a cost that would consist not only in the market value of the house.
The willingness to pay for staying in her house would probably be much larger
than its market value. Moreover, she would loose a part of her social capital,
and need to build a new life after her migration. Overall, let us assume that the
cost of the rising ocean would be for her $200’000 when it happens. It means
that, if the Bangladesh is submerged in 2055, the instantaneous cost of global
warming for this household would be $200’000. According to the classical
stock-pollution modeling, if the climate stabilizes after 2055 and forever, this
$200’000 cost would be beard every period until infinity, which means that, at
every period, the household would build a new house at the same submerged
place as the first, and would have to migrate again. Moreover, since the cost,
in these models, are expressed in terms of percentage of GDP, the cost would
be higher at each period (the willingness to pay for staying at the submerged
place and/or the market value of the house would increase proportionally with
the GDP). On the contrary, in this paper, we assume that once she moved from
the submerged area, the household stops building houses there. She is assumed
to build her new house in a place that is safe given the current temperature.
Second example: the migrations due to drought. Obviously, if big areas become
unfarmable because of drought, it will result in a huge cost. But it will also
probably result in a desertification of the region, or, at least, an abandon
of agriculture in this place. Once a region has become a desert, how could
10 see Sinclair (1992) and Grimaud and Rouge´ (2005) for the analysis of pollution
caused by a non-renewable resource.
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one assess the cost of climate change for this desert region? According to
the classical stock-pollution modeling, again, if the climate stabilizes, the cost
remains constant in terms of GDP percentage after the desertification. In this
paper, we assume that after the desertification, no more economic activity
take place in the region, and thus, climate change is no more costly for the
region.
Third example: the possible expansion to the north of certain tropical diseases
such as Malaria 11 . Malaria was present in Europe until the early 20th century,
when it was eradicated. This eradication can be thought of as an investment:
it consisted in expenditures (in DDT campaigns and changes in agricultural
techniques) that resulted in a further health improvement, which obviously
has an economic value. Thus, we can consider a malaria-free environment as a
capital good. If climate change brings back malaria in Europe, then this capital
good is destroyed. It will result in health consequences for the short run, and
in the need to re-invest in an eradication program. Again, the classical stock-
pollution modeling implicitly assumes an infinite persistence of the spread of
malaria, whereas we assume that a new eradication campaign has a cost, but
once it is done, there is no persistent cost.
Besides those speculative examples, a number of historical examples could
be drawn where a big change in natural environment have a very high cost
on the short-middle run, but virtually no effect on the very long run. Take,
for instance, Pi-Ramsesses, once the capital city of the Egyptian Empire. Pi-
Ramsesses was built in the northeastern region of the Nile Delta, but for
millennia, scholars did not know the precise location. Discoveries by Austrian
archaeologist Manfred Bietak 12 suggest that this location was the current
Qantir, a very small town, that was irrigated by a branch of the Nile. According
to Bietak, a fluctuation of this branch led the place to extreme drought, which
made life unsustainable. Thus, the city was abandoned. There is no doubt that
this environmental change led to an important economic loss. If Pi-Ramsesses’
GDP was x% of Egyptian GDP, then the cost of this environmental change
was probably not far from x% of Egyptian GDP, since a large part of the city’s
economic activity stopped. However, would anyone believe that a turning back
of the branch of the Nile in its original position would increase Egyptian GDP
by x%? This would be an audacious belief. Nevertheless, this belief would be
consistant with Stern-Nordhaus’ modeling.
11 Notice that a scientific consensus does not exist about the likelihood of a spread
of tropical diseases due to global warming.
12 Bietak (1996).
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2 Modeling the cost of climate change
In this section, we describe the way we modify Nordhaus DICE model in order
to integrate our modeling of the cost of climate change. Let Kt,t′ be the stock
of t′th generation of physical capital at time t. The only difference between two
generations of capital is that each one is fit to the state of the climate at the
time it is built. Capital depreciation has two components: a constant, linear
one, δKt,t′ ( δ ∈]0; 1[ ), and another one that depends on the gap between the
current climate, proxied by the temperature Tt, and the climate at the date
when the stock was built Tt′ : φ (|Tt − Tt′ |). We assume φ′ > 0, φ(0) = 0 and
φ ∈]0; 1− δ[. The dynamics of each generation of capital is given by:
Kt+1,t′ =

Qt − Ct, if t = t′
[1− δ − φ (|Tt − Tt′|)]Kt,t′ , if t > t′
0, if t < t′
(1)
Where Qt is the aggregate income and Ct the consumption. The aggregate
stock of capital is given by:
Kt =
t∑
t′=0
Kt,t′
The evolution of the aggregate capital stock is given by:
Kt+1 −Kt = Qt − C − δ
t∑
t′=0
Kt,t′ −
t∑
t′=0
φ (|Tt − Tt′|)Kt,t′
which would reduce to Kt+1−Kt = Yt−C−δ
t∑
t′=0
Kt,t′ without climate change.
Clearly, the instantaneous cost of climate change is given by
t∑
t′=0
φ (|Tt − Tt′|)Kt,t′ .
The remaining of the model is the classic DICE model. A representative house-
hold maximizes:
∞∑
t=0
Lt
c1−αt
1− α (1 + ρ)
−t
with α > 0 and ct ≡ Ct/Lt, subject to the law of motion for each stock of
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capital (equation 1) and to an initial value K0 given. It is assumed that all the
stocks aggregated in K0 were built at the same (preindustrial) temperature.
Resource extraction is constrained by the limits in the fossil fuel resources:
∞∑
t=0
Et ≤ S
where S is the initial value of the (non-renewable) resource stock. The emission
level is a function of gross production (Yt) and abatement efforts (µt ∈ [0, 1]):
Et = σt (1− µt)Yt
Where σt > 0 is an exogenously decreasing factor. Abatement efforts lower
the GDP, so the aggregate income net of the abatement cost is:
Qt =
(
1− θ1,tµθ2t
)
Yt
where θ1,t > 0 and θ2 > 0 are parameters. Gross production is a Cobb-Douglas
function of aggregate capital, labor (Lt) and an exogenously increasing TFP
factor (At):
Yt = AtK
γ
t L
1−γ
t
(γ ∈]0, 1[) We specify φ function, for simplicity, as:
φ (|Tt − Tt′ |) = ψ1|Tt − Tt′|+ ψ2|Tt − Tt′|2
(ψ1 > 0;ψ2 > 0) and we verify, when we perform the simulations, that the
condition φ ∈]0; 1− δ[ is always respected.
The remaining is the complex 13 climatic module of the DICE, which we
present in appendix A. This module establishes the dynamic link between
the (industrial) emissions Et and the atmospheric average temperature Tt.
Solving this program gives the optimal consumption-emission path, for a given
value of (ρ, α). Following Nordhaus (2007), we also compute a business as
usual (BAU) path, which is done in two stages: first, we compute a Hotelling
path by setting φ = 0. This gives the consumption-emission path that would
be optimal 14 in the absence of climate change. From this run, we save the
rates of emission control. Then, we implement a new run that integrates the
φ function, and we force the emission control rates to be the same as in the
13 From an economist’s point of view...
14 This optimum would also be a decentralised equilibrium if ρ and α are the same
for the households and for the central planner.
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Hotelling path.
3 Results
We now present the results of the simulations with the original DICE (o-
DICE) and our modified version (m-DICE). With each model, we compute
the BAU outcome, the optimal outcome with Nordhaus’ 1.5% rate of time
preference (1.5%-opt) and the optimal outcome with Stern’s 0.1% rate of time
preference (0.1%-opt). Notice that, in every case, we take Nordhaus’ elasticity
of marginal utility of consumption (α = 2) 15 . For all the other parameters,
we use the same as Nordhaus (2007) and we set ψ1 = 0.03 and ψ1 = 0.02,
which makes the cost of climate change in line with Nordhaus’ estimate for
the twenty first century in the BAU run. More precisely, this calibration makes
the cost higher than Nordhaus’ before 2060, and lower after this date. This
calibration is based on the assumption that the assessment studies used by
Nordhaus provide a good forecast for the next fifty years.
3.1 The carbon tax is always lower than with the original DICE model
As can be seen in figure B.2, the modified DICE model advocates a $11.9
($12.1) carbon tax 16 in 2015 for a 1.5% (0.1%) discount rate. These levels
are much lower than what results from the original DICE model (respectively
$41.8 and $90.1). This comes from the difference in the long run damage be-
tween both versions. Indeed, between 2015 and approximately 2060 for the
ρ = 1.5% optimal run 17 , the damage of climate change is higher in the mod-
ified version than in the original one. This is shown in figure B.3. Thus, it
can not be stated that the modified version underestimates the cost of climate
change for the next five decades, at least compared to the DICE model. On
the other hand, starting from the end of the twenty first century, the damage
becomes much higher with the original version than with the modified one, as
one can see in figure B.4 (mind the logarithmic scale!). The local minimum
attained at the end of the twenty third century corresponds to the beginning
15 We don’t present the results of the simulations with an unitary elasticity, because
they don’t add any significant analytical insight. Basically, as for the rate of time
preference, switching from Nordhaus’ α = 2 to Stern’s α = 1 has an important
effect with the original DICE and a small one with the modified version.
16 In both models, following Nordhaus (2007), the carbon tax is given by the opposite
of the multiplier of the emission constraint Et − σt (1− µt)Yt = 0 divided by the
discounted marginal utility of consumption (i.e. the shadow price of the capital
stock).
17 and approximately 2080 for the ρ = 0.1% optimal run.
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of a slight global cooling. Notice that cooling, in our model, has the same effect
as warning, since the change in temperature is measured in absolute value: a
one degree warming has the same cost than a one degree cooling. At the same
period, with the original Dice model, one can observe a slight lowering in the
slope of the instantaneous cost. Of course, the original Dice model takes a
cooling as a beneficial phenomenon.
3.2 Changes in discount rate have a small effect on the first periods optimal
tax
In the original DICE model, the cost of climate change increases dramatically
over time for two reasons: first, because the temperature is higher in the future
than in the present and the cost depends on temperature; second because the
cost is a percentage of GDP and GDP is higher in the future than in the
present. It follows that, in this original version, climate change is wildly a
matter for the future generations. Thus, a change in the discount rate has a
very high impact on the carbon tax in the first period. The less you care for
the future (the higher ρ), the smallest the carbon tax.
In the modified version, the cost of climate change depends in the change
in temperature, which does not depend monotonically of time. However, this
cost is expressed as a percentage of the capital, and the capital increases over
time. Thus, in the modified version, future generations tend to suffer more than
present one from climate change. But the increase in the damage is much less
dramatic than in the original DICE model.
The consequence is that a change in the discount rate has a limited impact
on the carbon tax in the first period. It follows that the debate on the dis-
count rate should have less importance than it has since the Stern-Nordhaus
controversy.
4 Discussion
The numerical results of this paper are likely to be controversial, since they
result in a low carbon tax, compared to the results of the existing literature.
However, the main purpose of this paper is not to advocate such a low carbon
tax, but to underscore the possibility that the usual modeling of the cost
of climate change might not be the only possible modeling. Nordhaus’ main
argument against Stern’s review is the following:
How do damages, which average around 1 percent of output over the next
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century, become a 14.4 percent reduction in consumption now and forever? The
answer is that, with near-zero discounting, the low damages in the next two
centuries get overwhelmed by the long-term average over the many centuries
that follow. In fact, using the [Stern] Review’s methodology, more than half
of the estimated damages ”now and forever” occur after the year 2800. The
damage puzzle is resolved. The large damages from global warming reflect
large and speculative damages in the far-distant future magnified into a large
current value by a near-zero time discount rate.
Nordhaus believes the far-distant damages are speculative. If this is a way to re-
fer to the scientific uncertainty about the impact of climate change in the very
long run, then it cannot by itself be taken as a justification for disregarding
it. Gollier (2006) shows, on the contrary, that uncertainty on environmental
damage should lead to a decrease in the discount rate. In fact, one can infer
that Nordhaus can hardly figure out that after several centuries of temperature
stabilization, very-distant future generations could suffer from the fact that
the average temperature is hotter than nowadays. However, this is consistent
with his own modeling of the temperature as a public bad. The alternative
modeling we propose in this paper may fit to what Nordhaus has in mind when
he calls speculative the far-distant damages. It focuses on the change in the
temperature and not on the level of the temperature as a factor of damage. Of
course, this modeling also has its challenges. Life on earth would certainly be
impossible for very low or very high temperatures. Thus, if economic welfare
can be represented as a function of the temperature, the curve would probably
be a reverted U-shaped one, whereas our modeling implicitly assumes it is flat.
Figure B.5 pictures what should probably look like the impact of climate
change on economic welfare. This impact is twofold: first, the change would
be harmful by itself because of the adjustment costs, second it would lead
the economy to a different temperature, that would be more of less welfare
enhancing. In this case, Stern-Nordhaus’ approach and ours would only be two
polar cases, and discounting would have a bigger impact than what we find
here. Thus, the big issue is to determine which of the slopes is the greatest. If
W (T,∆T ) is the welfare as a function of the temperature and of the change
in temperature, then the big issue is to compare
∣∣∣∂W
∂T
∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣ ∂W
∂∆T
∣∣∣.
Given the numerical importance of this issue, empirical assessment of the cost
of global warning should distinguish what part of the cost is due to the new
temperature and what part is due to the change in temperature. Actually, some
studies explicitly take the temperature level as a argument of the aggregate
production function, such as Choiniere and Horowitz (2000) or Van Kooten
(2004). However, those studies can hardly account for the major expected
economic impacts of climate change, such as disease spreading, the increase in
the sea level, the climate refugees, since those phenomenons are not accounted
for in the per-capita GDP measure.
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The assessment study by Mendelsohn et al. (1994) for the agriculture also
links the agricultural yields with the climate. The authors account for the
adaptation of the farmers to the changes in climate, but only in terms of the
choice of crops. The more fundamental choice of what land to make farmable
is exogenous. This assumption is relevant for a few decades, but probably not
for several centuries. Indeed, in the very long run, farmers should be allowed
to choose the lands to be exploited, and not only the type of use of a given
land.
In a recent study, Dell et al. (2009) discriminate between the short-run im-
pact of an unexpected change in temperature and the long-run economic im-
pact of climate, after adaptation is enforced. The long-run cost, i.e. the after-
adaptation cost, relies on the differences within a given country in gdp and
temperature. However, the location choice is not explained in this paper, and
one can guess that the productive activities take place in temperate regions.
Both aforementioned studies are confronted with the difficulty of defining the
long term, i.e. the term after which adaptation is expected to take place. In
virtually every economic context, ’short run’ means several months, while ’long
run’ means no more than several years. In the context of climate change, even
several decades might not be long enough a term for full adaptation, because
of the radical changes that can be induced by climatic events, such as big
population migrations. We hope the model presented in this paper can help
thinking more smoothly this adaptation process.
Conclusion
Climate change is often viewed as one of the major global issues of the twenty
first century. Most assessment studies show, indeed, that substantial costs are
likely to be suffered because of the increase in the average temperature. The
mainstream interpretation is that climate change is about to move the global
economy from a favorable climate to a less favorable one. This paper suggests
another interpretation of this cost. We argue that the cost is due to the need of
adaptation to the new climate. This is captured by a vintage capital model in
which each generation of durable good is labeled by the temperature that pre-
vails when it is built. With this model, if the temperature stabilizes on the long
run, the cost is asymptotically nil, whereas, with the usual modeling, it tends
to be a constant percent of GDP. This model is consistent with the fact that
few contemporary Egyptians are interested by the irrigation of Pi-Ramsesses.
The main result of this model is that the optimal carbon tax is much less
sensitive to the discount rate than in the Stern-Nordhaus controversy. The
second is that this tax is lower than it is in previous studies.
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A DICE’s climate module
Dice’s climate module is given by the following set of equations:
Mat(t) = E(t) + Eland(t) + κ11Mat(t− 1) + κ21Mup(t− 1)
Mup(t) = κ12Mat(t− 1) + κ22Mup(t− 1) + κ32Mlo(t− 1)
Mlo(t) = κ23Mup(t− 1) + κ33Mlo(t− 1)
F (t) = η {log2 [Mat(t)/Mat(1750)]}+ Fex(t)
T (t) = T (t− 1) + ξ1 {F (t)− ξ2T (t− 1)− ξ3 [T (t− 1)− Tlo(t− 1)]}
Tlo(t) = Tlo(t− 1) + ξ4 [T (t− 1)− Tlo(t− 1)]
where: Mat(t), Mup(t) and Mlo(t) are the carbon concentrations at time t in the
atmosphere, the upper oceans and the lower oceans. Eland(t) is the exogenous
emission level due to the changes in land use. F (t) is the total radiative forcing,
and Fex the exogenous forcing. T (t) and Tlo(t) are the temperature levels in
the atmosphere and in upper oceans, expressed in difference with the pre-
industrial level. κi,j and ξk are parameters.
Figure B.1 illustrates those relations.
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B figures
Fig. B.1. DICE’s climate module
Fig. B.2. Time paths of the carbon tax
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Fig. B.3. Time paths of the instantaneous cost in the short run
Fig. B.4. Time paths of the instantaneous cost in the long run (logarithmic scale)
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Fig. B.5. Welfare impact of T and ∆T
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